Introduction
The decision made by the European Union (EU) at its inception to give official status to all official languages of its Member States (Regulation n°1/58, regularly updated after every enlargement)
1 has led to an intensive debate on its costs, advantages and disadvantages. The debate is characterised by a relatively high diversity of approaches, including applied linguistics (Phillipson, 2003; Ammon, 2006; Wright, 2009; Romaine, 2013) , discourse analysis (Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2011) , translation studies (Tosi, 2013) , political science (Pool provides a basis for normative statements on alternative policies, but such ethical statements are not addressed here.
The purpose of this article is to fill this gap by evaluating the fairness of the language policy of the EU or, more precisely, the likely effects on fairness of a change of the current language policy. In recent years the current language policy of the EU has been overtly criticised for being too costly and cumbersome. According to some authors using only one language would contribute to the effectiveness of the EU, and it would be a first step towards the creation of a genuine European demos that could eventually encourage the cohesion of the EU as a whole. (Ginsburgh and Weber, 2005) . A trilingual language regime seems to be supported by the European Commission for certain purposes and in some circumstances.
2
It is appropriate, therefore, to evaluate what could be the distributive effects of a drastic reduction in the number of EU official languages, and more precisely on the languages used for its external communication. Using data provided by Eurostat, this article shows that a reduction in the number of official languages of the EU or a reduction of the domains of use of some of the current official languages would disadvantage not only (and quite obviously) the citizens of some Member States; it would be also particularly detrimental to the weakest social groups within those countries. The main finding of this article is that the current full multilingual policy of the EU, based on translation and interpreting, is not only the most effective language policy among the alternative options usually put forward in the literature; it is also (and it will be for the foreseeable future) the only one that is truly inclusive. This article is organised as follows.
Section number 2 illustrates the dataset used in this article. Section 3 compares the effectiveness of four alternative language policies, a preliminary step toward the evaluation of fairness, a 2 For example, the Commission argued in favour of a trilingual language regime based on English, French and
German for an open competition for the recruitment of administrators and assistants (e.g. Case C-566/10 P -Italy knowledge of English as a foreign language is quite widespread in the other three countries mentioned. However, these four countries together make up only 4% of the population of the EU, and it turns out that their exclusion does not change substantially the conclusions of this article (more on this below).
Besides demographic and socio-economic information on the respondents, the AES contains information on EU residents' native language(s) and on their knowledge of foreign languages.
Data on foreign languages have been collected with respect to 38 languages and on the basis of self-assessment by interviewees on a formally defined four-level scale of competence, that is:
the EU based on Eurobarometer data (e.g. Ginsburgh et al., 2005; Gazzola and Grin, 2013 On the basis of the results presented in Table 1 the following conclusions can be drawn. First, there is a significant difference between absolute and relative disenfranchisement rates. This implies that, on average, EU citizens in the 24 countries considered do not have high skills in foreign languages. For example, 51% of EU citizens in our sample declare themselves as having at least some knowledge of English (including native speakers), but the percentage of citizens who declare themselves as "proficient" in English as a foreign language and native speaker of it are much lower (7.6% and 11.8% of the sample, respectively).
Second, the current multilingual language regime is by far the most effective language policy among the four alternatives examined. Thus, it would be misleading to look at a full multilingual language regime primarily as being the price to pay for the symbolic political equality among Member States; it is first and foremost the most effective language policy to convey information about the EU to Europeans. All the other alternative language regimes presented here would disenfranchise significant sections of EU citizens.
The positive value of the relative disenfranchisement rate for the multilingual policy (1.7%) is due to the presence of different minorities in some Member States, notably, the Russianspeaking minority and, to some extent, Arabic-and Turkish-speaking citizens with limited proficiency in the local, dominant official language. This result, however, must be interpreted with caution due to a problem in the data collection in France (more on this below). A positive, although very low, Dr associated with the status quo means that the relative disenfranchisement rate resulting from the three alternative language regimes must be read in additional terms. For example, as 1.7% of EU citizens are (relatively) linguistically disenfranchised anyway, the additional (or marginal) Dr associated with the monolingual language regime is 78.9%. In other worlds, moving from a multilingual language regime based on 22 official language towards a monolingual language regime would increase Dr by 78.9 percentage points.
Finally, the data reveals that knowledge of English is not a "basic skill" and that this language is not a universal lingua franca in Europe as is mistakenly argued by different authors (e.g. Rose
2008
; Cogo and Jenkins 2010) . In the 24 countries considered, between 49% and 80% of EU citizens either do speak it or know it to a level which is not likely to be high enough to take part in EU business without too much effort. One could argue that these results are biased by two factors. First, the exclusion of countries such as Ireland and the Netherlands, and second by the lack of data on the level of proficiency in foreign languages in Denmark (as regards the first and second foreign language) and Italy (limited to the second foreign language). However, other studies (e.g. Gazzola and Grin, 2013) using a different dataset (i.e. the Eurobarometer 2012) covering 28 Member States converge towards very similar percentages. We hasten to clarify that the conceptual difference between English and ELF -"English-as-a-lingua franca" (Hülmbauer and Seidlhofer, 2013; Formentelli, 2012 ) -has no policy relevance because essentially ELF is English (see Gazzola and Grin, 2013 ; Fiedler 2010 for a discussion).
Significant differences exist among countries, as shown in Table 2 here
Before moving to the next section, let us discuss three possible criticisms of the use of the disenfranchisement rate in language policy evaluation. First, one could argue that not all
European citizens are necessarily interested in the business of the EU and that just a tiny minority of people actually needs to be informed about the process and the outcomes of EU A text published in Bulgarian, no matter whether the language used is clear or not, will probably not be understood by monolingual Portuguese-speaking citizens.
Finally, some authors argue that the linguistic proximity of a set of official languages can affect the value of the disenfranchisement rates (Ginsburgh et al. 2005) . It is common knowledge that Spanish can be relatively easier to understand for Italians compared with Finnish, but "intercomprehension" (that is, the mutual understanding between cognate languages) works well only if it is the target of specific training (Conti and Grin 2008). Such training is still not widespread in Europe today.
The Evaluation of the Fairness of the EU's Language Policy
In this article, the fairness of alternative language policies is assessed on the basis of the distribution of the disenfranchisement rate across social groups (the notion of "social group" is used in a broad sense in order to include individuals with a similar socio-economic status). It is quite logical that a monolingual or a trilingual language regime would disadvantage the citizens of some Member States more than others. Yet, to our knowledge, it is has never been clarified which social groups within Member States would suffer more from a reduction in the number of official languages and, most importantly, by how much. This is a crucial piece of information in ex ante policy evaluation. Generally speaking, a careful comparison of the likely impacts of alternative policy options should be carried out in order to make informed decisions about which policy is best suited to achieve some relevant policy goals. Surprisingly, with few exceptions, the majority of the authors who recommend a decrease in the number of official languages of the EU provide no empirical analysis of the expected outcomes of such a choice.
The AES allows us to characterise EU citizens according to different relevant socio-economic dimensions, in particular their age, income status, educational level achieved and occupational status. Consequently, we define four macro social-groups on the basis of these variables, and we examine the relationships between them and the disenfranchisement rates. Table 3 puts the results of Table 1 into perspective by introducing the time dimension in our analysis. As the AES is not a panel dataset we cannot explore the variation of the disenfranchisement rates across time.
Nevertheless, studying the change of the disenfranchisement rates across generations provides a first idea of the likely evolution of the disenfranchisement rates in the future. Results show a clear relationship between the absolute disenfranchisement rate and age:
younger generations tend to speak foreign languages more often than older ones, and, therefore, the Da is lower among the younger. The absolute disenfranchisement rate associated with an English-only language regime, for example, is 62.5% among citizens aged 55-64 but only 35.4% among those aged 25-34 (recall that native speakers of English are included). We observe the same trend for all three language regimes presented as alternatives to the status quo.
Nevertheless, the Dr tends to be high and rather constant across generations. For the trilingual, the oligarchic and even the multilingual language regimes, the relative disenfranchisement rate, probably as a result of recent migration flows, is even slightly higher among the younger generation than the older. The main conclusion is that, on average, younger EU citizens are more likely to have acquired at least some knowledge of foreign languages than their fathers (as shown by the difference in the means of Da across cohorts) but they do not learn them much better (as revealed by the difference in the means of Dr). This observation has important consequences for language policy: the need for translation and interpreting in the EU, at least for demanding texts, is not likely to change drastically in the future.
Evidence provided in Table 4 , 15 EU countries are rank-ordered according to the strength of the statistical correlation between the ordinal variable "income status" and the dichotomous variable "knowledge of at least one official language as a foreign language". The correlation is measured through the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient (ρ). 8 In order to avoid spurious correlations, native speakers of the official language(s) of a language regime must be excluded in this statistical analysis.
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In order to make the comparison between language regimes possible, in Table 4 countries are clustered in four groups that reflect four levels of correlation intensity. These groups are defined by the range of the value of ρ. The higher the value of ρ the higher the correlation. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is positive for all countries in our subset and all the language regimes given as alternatives to the status quo. Table 4 reveals a general correlation between the level of income of EU citizens and the fact that they have at least some knowledge of at least one of the official languages of a language regime as a foreign language. Generally speaking, EU citizens belonging to the fourth and the fifth quintile of the income distribution (i.e. those with a higher income) are more likely to have at least some knowledge of foreign languages and, therefore, are less likely to be disenfranchised if the number of the official languages of the EU were reduced. In other words, there is a relationship between the income status of EU citizens and their skills in foreign languages, and therefore a relationship between income status and the absolute disenfranchisement rate.
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There are significant differences between Member States. In some countries, e.g. Romania or Portugal, the relationship is stronger than in others (e.g. Hungary or Sweden). This could be due to the fact that in the latter countries some knowledge of foreign languages is quite widespread among the population (e.g. in Sweden), or, alternatively, it is not widespread among by the use of survey weights. Thus, not using weighting adjustment when we compute ρ at the level of individual countries, in practice, is not likely to cause significant bias in the estimates shown in Table 4 .
9 This is important for multilingual countries such as Belgium. For example, including native speakers of French in the assessment of the correlation between income status and the absolute disenfranchisement rate associated with the trilingual language regime would artificially weaken ρ because French is the mother tongue of a significant share of Belgian citizens.
citizens (e.g. in Hungary), no matter what their level of income is. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that the correlation between income status and disenfranchisement rate is independent from the language regime chosen. Putting it differently, any language regime among the three alternatives examined would create a higher disenfranchisement rate among citizens with a relatively lower income than among citizens who have a relatively higher income. By contrast, the current language regime, based on the formal equality among the EU official languages, does not entail significant inequalities among citizens based on income status, because the official languages used correspond, with some exceptions, to their mother tongue or primary language of education.
Let us turn to education. Table 5 presents the absolute and the relative disenfranchisement rates by the highest level of education successfully completed by EU citizens, defined in the AES following the ISCED classification. In Table 5 , only five levels of education are considered, that is, "primary" (9.2% of the sample), "lower secondary" (16.4%), "upper secondary" (45.8%, usually this level corresponds to the end of compulsory education), "post-secondary nontertiary" (4.2%), and "tertiary" (23.5%). The "pre-primary" level of education (0.9% of the sample) is ignored. Table 5 presents percentages based on the whole EU population; thus, native speakers are included).
Note, however, that the relative disenfranchisement rates are much higher, and they tend to be so also for citizens who achieved a tertiary level education. For example, a monolingual language regime would (relatively) disenfranchise almost two third of EU citizens who have achieved a tertiary level education. These results show that in Europe fluency in English, French or German is still a not a reality, even among the most educated.
Let us conclude this section by examining the distribution of the disenfranchisement rates according to the main occupational status of EU citizens. We focus on the most important types of occupational status, defined in the AES as (i) "people carrying out a job", which includes unpaid work for a family business, holding an apprenticeship or paid traineeship (69.8% of the sample), (ii) "unemployed" (6.9%), (iii) "retired" (8%), (iv) "permanently disabled" (3.1%), and (v) people "fulfilling domestic tasks" (8.8%). Table 6 disregards the classes formally defined as "pupils, students, people in training", and citizens "involved in compulsory military service" as they represent only 1% or less of the sample. Table 6 here Table 6 shows that the disenfranchisement rates tend to be unevenly distributed across occupational statuses: lower for EU citizens carrying out a job, higher for unemployed and retired people, the permanently disabled and citizens fulfilling domestic tasks (a variable strongly correlated with gender).
Conclusion and Discussion
Empirical evidence does not support the claim that an English-only or restricted multilingual language regimes (which we have called "trilingual" and "oligarchic") in the EU would contribute to the effectiveness of European communication and to its cohesion. Rather, our results tend to show that the contrary is likely to be true, thus confirming the conclusions of other studies (e.g. Phillipson 2003; Gazzola and Grin 2013; Backus et al. 2013; Barbier 2013; Kraus, 2008) . First, a monolingual language policy based on English-only or restricted multilingual language regimes would be much less effective than the current language policy of the EU in the foreseeable future. Second, a drastic reduction of the official language of the EU would have regressive effects, that is, it would be particularly detrimental to members of the weakest groups in society and, in particular, the older, the least educated citizens, those with the lowest income status, the unemployed, retired people, the permanently disabled and women fulfilling domestic tasks. This confirms the fact that individual multilingual skills in Europe still tend to be, on average, an elite phenomenon, 11 and that a reduction in the number of official languages regimes tend to privilege the better-off. Hence, these results support the claim that translation and interpreting, by making it possible to implement a full multilingual regime based on the mother tongues or the primary language of education of the vast majority of EU citizens and taxpayers, can contribute to social cohesion and European integration (European Commission 2010).
In order to test the logical robustness of our findings, two counter-arguments must be briefly discussed. Let us call them the "cost argument" and the "linguistic assimilation argument". The Given the current distribution of language skills among EU citizens, reducing the direct costs of the EU language regime through an English-centred language regime, an oligarchic or a trilingual policy would essentially amount to shifting the costs of multilingualism onto
European citizens who do not know the official languages well enough, and more specifically onto the worse-off. In addition, to our knowledge, it has never been demonstrated that, on the aggregate, this would cost less than using a centralised translation system. Let us make a 
